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STATE:'vlPJ''J' OF TH~ 'JA,,,URE OF THF. CASE 
This is a case for wroncrful termination of an insurance 
salesman· 
DISPOSITIO"l OF THF CASE BT THE 101.YER COURT 
Ap~ellant challenqed the ter~ination with three theories 
restitution, contract and tort. The trial court dis~issed the 
res ti tut ion claim without receiving any evidence on that issue. 
Evidence was submitted on the contract and tort issues. After 
appellant's evidence, the trial court qr anted a directed verdict 
in favor of respondent on the contract claim and the tort claim. 
RELIEF sour.HT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a new trial. 
I. THE BAD FAITI! CLAIM 
A. Factual Basis for the Bad Faith Claim. 
Mann is an insurance salesman. American Western is a life 
insurance company. Mann worked for American Western for fifteen 
years. (R. 1251). During part of that time ~ann served under a 
written agreement. (E'x. 1-P and 109-P). During the balance of 
the time ~1ann served under an oral agreement. 
1252-1254, 1288, 1324). 
(R. 1184-1186, 
American Western is operated basically as a pyramid plan. 
IR. 1034 and 1038). That sales approach is unique in the entire 
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insurance industry. ( R. 10 31) . Under this pyramid plan ar, 
aqent really has two responsibilities: to sell new insurance 
policies and to recruit new sales ac:rents (called sub-aaents), 
Agents are paid for recruiting new sub-aqents bv ~ 
override commission on the production of the sub-acrent 
(R. 1034-1037). The sub-agent can in turn recruit a sub-sub· 
aqent. In that case the original agent and the sub-aaent bee: 
get an override commission from sales made by the sub-sub-ace:· 
Eventually there is a whole pyramid o~ sales people each 
qetting an override on the sales of those under him in the 
pyramid. (R. 1034-1037). 
The ultimate goal for an agent would be to get so many 
sub-agents and sub-sub-agents that an agent could stop active 
sales and live off the override commissions of the sub-acrents 
(R. 1049). 
Within the pyramid each agent has a responsibility to 
supervise sub-agents below him in the pyramid. However, the 
supervisory duties are minimal. (R. 1046 and 1049). 
Accordinq to custom and usage, agents have an ownershir 
interest in their sub-agents. The group of sub-agents workinc 
under an aqent is referred to as a "pedicrree". These pediqre~ 
were sometimes bought and sold. (R. 1199, Ex. 108-P) · 
In ot'..: 
· h 11 11 of hi' s sub-acrents to a felloi· words, one agent miq t se a 
agent. 
11 futu:: 
The new purchaser would then be entitled to a 
overrides. (R. 1205). 
ld ~,,;: 
Sometimes American Nestern wou · 
_.,_ 
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sJch pedigree accounts directly froi!1 an agent. 
sx. 79-P) • 
(R. U06, 
llann spent about 89-90% of his time recruiting sub-
agents. ~oreover, he had to pay his own expenses. He paid 
:or luncheons, advertising, gas, automobile, telephone, 
secretary, rent, etc. (R. 1292). Mann received no salary for 
his investrnen t of time and money. His sole compensation was 
the override if the sub-agents were successful, or indebtedness 
if the sub-agents were unsuccessful. (R. 1291). 
~ann also had the responsibility to help finance his 
sub-agents. American Western paid advances and lo"ins to the 
sub-agents, but Mann had to guarantee the advances. If the 
sub-agent did not repay the loan, Mann had to pay. (R. 1090 
and 1294 I. In this case American Western counterclaimed against 
Mann for $29,550.58 because of defaults by :-ilann's sub-a<Jents. 
Mann did an excellent job. He received 16 personal 
letters of commendation from the President of American Western 
for his work. (R. 1174-1179, Exhibits 12-P, 13-P, 14-P, 17-P, 
19-P, 21-P, 23-P, 25-P, 26-P, 28-P, 29-P, 30-P, 31-P, 32-P, 
33-P, 50-P). In fact, in 1975 Mann and his sub-agents produced 
61% of the business for the entire company. (Ex. 62-P, •r 4). 
In the spring of 1976 United American Life of Denver took 
over control of American Western. (R. 1192). One of the first 
actions of the new owners was to fire ~1ann. Mann was not told 
he was fired. (Ex. 54-P). The new management did not 
-3-
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inform 'tann of any alleged shortcominas in his i;ierfor:nance. 
They did not request ~1ann to nake any chancres in his per-
formance. They did not warn him, nor did they qive hi~ a 
second chance. (R. 1127-1129). In fact, c1ann drove to 
Denver to talk to the new owners, but they refused to s~ 
him. (R. 1312-1313). They just fired him. After he ~s 
fired '1ann received no further overrides on the production 
of his sub-agents. 
The old management team did not agree with the decis1'" 
to fire Mann. They thought Mann should stay. (R. 1191). 
However, they were not even consulted. The decision to fire 
Mann was made by the new management team in the Denver offic: 
of United American. (R. 1104-1106). In fact, the new owner: 
decided to fire Mann without even knowing what the terms of 
his employment agreement were. (R. 1139). 
At trial the new management team was asked why they 
fired Mann. They testified that the primary reason was lac\ 
of "on-site" supervision. (R. 1120). The theory was that 
Mann could not supervise Schustrin and other California sub· 
agents from Salt Lake City. ( R. 1110) . However, after 'lann 
was fired the company still did not provide "on-site" super· 
vision for the California agents. Instead, the California 
· · oen•:: 
agents were supervised directly from the head office in · 
(R. 1173,cf. 1104). No one explained why it was easier to 
h frc< 
supervise agents from Denver to California rather t an · 
Salt Lake City to California. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c: 
r: 
t 
A jury could reasonably conclude that the real reason 
:iann was terminated was to take advantage of sub-agents which 
:~ann had recruited, trained, and financed, without paying 
overrides to Mann. 
B. The Tort of Bad Faith. 
i\ well established rule of contract law is that, "every 
contract implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing between 
the parties See generally, 17 Arn. Jur. 2d Contracts 
256; Zims Properties~~~Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975). 
Recent cases have recognized that a breac~ of the covenant 
of good faith constitutes a tort. 
The great landmark case in this area is Gruenberq v. Aetna 
Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P. 2d 1032 (1973). That case 
involved a claim that an insurance company had, in bad faith, 
refused to pay an insurance claim. The court stated: 
It is the oblicration, deemed to be imposed 
by the law, under which the insurer must act 
fairly and in good faith in discharging its 
contractual responsibilities. Where in so 
doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good 
faith with its insured by refusing, without 
proper cause, to compensate its insured for 
a loss covered by the policy, such conduct 
may give rise to a cause of action in tort 
for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing • • . . Accordingly, 
when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith 
withholds payment of the claim of its insured, 
it is subject to liability in tort. 
See also: Fletcher v. Western National Life, 10 Cal. App. 1d 
l 76, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Escambia Tradincr v. Aetna Cas. & 
-"-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~~rety Co., 421 F.Supp. 1367 ('l.D. Fla. 19711); ~arrett 'I. 
American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 102 (1974); c· .. 
~-
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 ;-J.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169 (1976). 
C. The Standard of Bad Faith in Ut~h Case Law. 
This Supreme Court has had an opportunity to consider 
the law of bad faith on a number of occasions. 
The third case was Butterfield v. Consolidated Fuel::. 
42 Utah 499 (1913). In that case, plaintiff was a broker. 
Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement to sell certa~~ 
for a commission. He apparently made presentations to a :e·• 
potential buyers, including one Mr. Caldwell. Caldwell ~e:::· 
the proposal. Plaintiff made no further contact with Cal&•: 
and the Caldwell deal was dead. 
For a period of several months plaintiff failed to pre:. 
any other prospective purchasers. Defendant then wrote to 
plaintiff and fired him. After plaintiff was fired, defen:r· 
contacted Caldwell to renew or rekindle the negotiations. 
Caldwell agreed to reconsider the situation and did, in fac:. 
purchase $400,000.00 of the bond issue. 
Plaintiff sued defendant for the unpaid broker's 
commission. The lower court granted a non-suit and plainti:' 
appealed. The Supreme Court of Utah held that the i\qency 
between plaintiff and defendant could be terminated at anv 
time without consent of the agent. The Court then held t~'· 
the agency had been validly revoked before the sale took , .. 
cornn"'' 
and that plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to a 
d 
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However, the Court went to great lenaths to explain what 
the result would otherwise be if there was a showinq of bad 
bz 
faith: 
Under the contract in question, res~ondent had 
the legal right to terminate appellant's authoritv 
at any time, provided it was done in good faith -
and not for the purpose of preventinq him from 
consuITL~ating pending neaotiations to deprive him 
of his commissions. Butterfield v. Consolidated 
5:_uel Co., 42 Utah 499-(1913). 
Butterfield is very similar to this case. Both cases 
involve the relationship of principal-aaent. In both cases 
the agent was working for a commission. In both cases the 
9ployrnent contract was for an indefinite period. Both cases 
involve termination of the agent. 
In Ensign, et al. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 107 Utah 
557, 155 P.2d 965 (1945), Ensic;m, an insurance broker, sold an 
insurance policy to Airway Motor Coach Lines. Later, Airway 
requested a change in the policy terms. Ensign tried one 
telephone cal 1 to secure the new rates, but he was unable to 
reach the person who could quote them. Thereafter, Airways 
bought the insurance from the same defendant insurance company 
but through some new broker. Ensign sued the insurance col'lpnny 
for the lost commission. 
Ensign lost the case because he had placed only a sinqle 
telephone call and had not diliaently followed throuah to sell 
::;ie business. However, the Court noted that, 
~or ... could it [insurance company] arbitrarily 
refuse quotations to an aqent of a proper rate and 
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secure the insurance throuch another at such 
rate ... To do so would evidence a lack of 
fair dealina which would deprive appellants 0 ~ 
the contemplated fruits of their contrac~ with 
respondent. 
The next Utah case is State~~tomo~ile ~_Casualt? fo'e· 
----'----: 
'~.E.~te~2.:.. S~lisbury, 27 Utah 2d ?.29, 494 P.2d 52C1 (19i2). 
That case involved the ·relationship between an insura::ice 
col.lpany and its general 2.aent. The aeneral aaent '."Ian wri:te: 
an insurance policy <:or a client and issued a. "bi.nc'.er". '',; 
general agent then submitted the policy to the insurance cor:c 
The insurance company rejected the policy and returned it to: 
general agent. However, the insured party had an il.ccident a':' 
the "binder" was issued, but before the policy was reiected t> 
the insurance company. The insurance company honored the 
"binder" by paying $19,758.71 to the insured party. The 
insurance company then sued its own general agent for wroncrf{ 
issuing the binder. 
The issue presented for appeal was whether the qeneral 
agent had a duty (contractual or otherwise) to seek aporovol 
before issuing such binders. The Court stated: 
• . • each has a right to assume that the other will 
perform the duties he agrees to with reasonable care, 
competence, diliaence and crood faith, even thouqh 
such terms are not expressiy-Sperred out in the 
contract. [Emphasis added.] 
See also: 
2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967): 
. r. While the expressions of courts have var1e-
sornewhat as to the duty of insurance companies 
• 
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b 
~ t~ respect to makina and acceotina oronosals 
o settlement to protect its insured,-we believe 
t at the best view is that it must act in good 
faith and be as zealous in protectinq the interests 
of its insured as it would in lookina a:ter its 
own. ~hether it discharaes that dutv mav ~ecend 
upon various considerations including the certaintv 
or uncertainty as to the issues o= liability and -
da!".'ages. 
o. Bad =aith Termination Cases. 
I:1 the trial court, Ar'lerican 'vestern araued that ·~arm 
·.;as subject to ter!".'.ination "with or 1·1i thout cause". Arnerican 
~stern =urther araued that the concept "without cause" per~its 
an employer to terminate for any reason -- even in bad faith and 
with malice. 
Defendant's view of the law had its roots in Enqland 
during the Industrial Revolution. At that time, the employer 
was indeed King. ~vomen and children worked for pal try waqes 
in pitiful conditions and labor unions were unlawf'...11. The law 
even permitted a system of indentured servants. However, the 
law governinq relations between master and servant has evolved 
to reflect more enlicrhtened views of social and economic concUtions. 
So, also, has the concept of termination "without cause" 
changed. As recently as twenty years ago the term "without 
cause" really meant just that. Employees could be terminated 
:or no reason and with malice and bad faith. However, around 
~~t time, thoughtful minds began to question the harsh doctrine 
J'. termination "without cause". See, e.q., Termination of 
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Em?loyri.ent at \'/ill - Public ?olicy '1a•! ;.1odi~·1 O":n:,:1 0 .:e:'s "-
to Dischar-:re, 14 :«.ut~ers L. ?.e•1. 624 (1960): Blu!Tlrosen, £·: 
-....:...::.:., 
Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 Rutsers L. ?.ev. -!28, 431-31 11,; 
~rote, California's Controls on Employer .ll.buse of EMployee 
~olitical Rights, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1015 (1970); Blades, ~rn~~-
-:..:.:_ 
::ient at l"lill v. Individual Freedoms: On Limiting Abusbe ::,;: 
~f_Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1418 (1967). 
The upshot is that largely within the last decace a:;' 
and dominant view has emerged in the law. This vie1-1 hol::s: 
In all employment contracts, whether at will 
or for a definite term, the emclover's interest 
in running his business as he see~ fit must be 
balanced against the interest of the employee in 
maintaining his employment, and the public's inter· 
est in maintaining a proper balance between the 
two •.. A termination by the employer of a 
contract of employnent at will which is motivated 
by bad faith, or malice, or based on retaliation 
is not in the best interest of the economic systen 
or the public good and cons ti tut es a breach of the 
ernployITlen t con tr act. Moncre v. Beebe Rubber Cornpanv, 
316 A.2d 549 (New Hamp:-1974) y 
A thoughtful law review article Makes the followinc 
co!TII'\ents on the standard of good faith in the termination c' 
insurance agents: 
Where good faith is implied, more arbitrary 
terminations of agency may be eliminated ... · 
Requirements of fairness and reasonableness in 
termination of acrencv are hardl v radical c1epartures 
from the 'well-s~ttl~d' principles of contract lD· 
Y This case was included in the compilation Sicrn~ 
State Appellate Decisions Outline 1976, published bV t,e 
~ational College of the State Judiciary. 
-10- d 
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> 
The ooeration of the aaencv a~reenent itself reauires 
subst~ntial reliance upon good faith and mutual-trust 
between the parties to the workina business relation-
ship. To hold that such good faith princioles be 
appiied to the termination provisions is only the 
logical conclusion of careful contractual analysis. 
* * * 
Even accepting the more traditional approach to 
the law of contracts, the intricate relationshin 
between the termination of acrency and the interests 
of the :_Jolicyholder justifies the implications of 
coed faith and reasonableness. There is, as 
;reviously noted, a substantial oublic interest 
ln the continuation of the relatlonship between 
the agent and the company. The parties' private 
contractual aareement allowinq arbitrarv and 
unjustified ternination of t~e relationship should 
not be enforceable where abrupt termination contra-
venes the public interest. 
* * * 
The disparity of bargaining power has produced 
an agreement which operates to substantially favor 
the interests of the stronger party to the detriment 
of the weaker. In such case, the agreement deserves 
the statutory assurance that good faith and fairness 
will be preserved. Nhere the interests of the public 
are so intimately involved, however, inequitable ter-
mination provisions must not be tolerated. 
Independent Insurance Agen~y_Agreements & the T~rmina~ 
tion of Agency: Antiquated Approach to the Modern 
Market, 49 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 286 (1969). 
The recent case of Randolph v. ~ew England ~utual Life 
Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1975) is on four squares with 
the matter sub j udice. 
This action, primarily for breach of contract. 
has its origins in a long-time contractual associa-
tion between the individual plaintiff-appellant 
(usuallv hereinafter referred to as "Randolph''), 
and his- father before him, with the defendant-
appellee insurance company (usually hereinafter 
"'lEL") 
~he fruits of the discoverv procedures earlier 
referred to exhaustively chronicle the long and 
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amicable relationship between the Randolchs 
and NEL, and include many laudatory stat~nents 
made by its hi~h officials, concerning the 
Randolph agency's diligence, initiative and 
e!fectiveness. 
This long period of arniabilitv ended 
July 15, 1969, abruptly or other-Wise; just 
how abrupt and unforseen this occurre11ce was 
depends upon which party's evidence is credited, 
but this is an issue which need not ~e reached 
here. Be that as it may, an ~EL vice-9resident, 
bv letter of that date, advised Randolph that 
·~e feel we have no alternative but to-nake a 
chanae in the management of our Cincinnati Aaen~ 
now I , and after SO!T\e further correspondence another 
~EL vice-president, by letter dated-September 5, 
196 9, exercised NEL' s 'right . . . to terminate t~e 
agency upon giving sixty days' notice in writinrr', 
the termination being effective November 4, 1%9. 
The sole legal issue which requires resolution 
is whether the contract executed April 27, 1969, 
was terminated by unilateral action of either party 
prior to its April 1, 1989 termination date, which 
in turn requires an interpretation of Section 15 of 
that Agreement. That section reads, 
"The agency shall terminate automatically 
the Normal Retirement Date or on the prior 
death of the General Aaent, but except as 
provided in Section 14-each of the carties 
hereto shall have the riaht to terminate 
the Aqen£_x_~~z:!X__prior time upon aiving. 
sixty_da~.'._ notice in w~iting." [Emphasis 
from original] . 
Although we hold that Section 15 authorizes .. 
termination "without cause", we conclude that Secti~n,: 
would not pert'lit either party to terminate in "bad ,a,. 
Even with no definite duration provisions, what we 
regard as the better reasonealine ol"C"as7s has 
imposed a duty of good faith on the exercise of a . 
facially unrestricted termination cal use. [Ernpha515 
added.] 
. h arantinc 
... For the reasons hereinabove stated, t,e 
of the motion for summary j udcrment was improper· 
_, ?-
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?eversed and remanded for further proceedincs 
not inconsistent herewith. 
For other bad faith terr1ination cases, see: Atkinson v. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 519 F.2d 1112 
(5th Cir. 1975): Reese v. Bank Building & Eauipment Corp. of 
~~' 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964): De'!'reville v. Outboard 
2rir:_~ Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (dt!1 Cir. 1971); Zimmer v. '.•7ells 
:!anaqement Corp., 348 F.Supp. 540 (S.D. 'LY. 1972) · ~'1ilton v. 
Hudson Sales Corp., 313 P. 2d 936 (Cal. ;._pp. 1957): Philadelphia 
Storage Battery v. Mutual Tire Stores, 159 S.E. 825 (S.C. 1931)' 
J.R. lvatkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.'·7. 845 (1931) 
(dictum) : Gellhorn, Lirni tations on Contract Termination Rights -
Franchise Cancellations, 1967 Duke L •• T. 465.~ cf. Merrill v. 
Continental Assurance Co., 200 Cal. App.2d 663, 19 Cal. ~ptr. 43?. 
11962). (Although the court found no evidence of bad faith, a 
good faith obligation appears to have been applied.) 
E. The Trial Court Erred by Grantinq a Directed 
Verdict On the Tort Claim for Bad Faith 
Termination. 
This is a case of first impression for Utah. '!'he issue 
is whether Utah will follow the lead of other states which 
> 
im;:iose a duty of good faith on the exercise of contractuaJ_ 
termination clauses. 
Where the law is unsettled, this court should be more 
concerned with what the law ouqht to be than what the law was 
i1 the past. 
_, ,_ 
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Although they have not spelled this out in 
express languaae, the fact o: t'.'le ::iatter is th.at 
the appellate state courts -- a rnajorit~ cf th.e~ 
at least -- have assumed responsibility for the 
current condition of the CO!T'l"On law o: torts --
its proper balancing of conpetina individual and 
social interests, its satisfactory response to 
current needs, and its attaining of current deals 
Recognizing that the conmen law rules were court: · 
developed, usually some time aao, the courts are 
consciously assuming the obligation of keeoinc 
the rules up to C!ate. - -
This, I suggest, is essentially to the good. 
It is better. I think, for the courts openlv to 
assume the duty of being the monitors of the 
state of the cor:unon law and to accect the res::ionsi-
bili ty for what they are doinq, tha~ to make chanaes 
covertly by pretending that they are only statiM 
what the law has been all along or are merely 
declaring a change that has come about by the 
self-unfolding of a legal idea. Creation of a 
new exception or expansion of an old one is 
modifying the rule, as surely as frankly changino 
it, because it has become outdated and obsolete. 
If the courts understand that they must bear the 
accountability for what they do, they may be 
expected to be more careful and more responsible 
than if they are able to cast off any censure by 
the fiction that they are doing no more than 
declarina what the law is and are not answerable 
for its condition. f'l"ade*, The ~1ost Important Tort 
Chanqe in the Third Quarter of the Twentieth Centur] 
20Kffi L. Rep. 413 (~av. 1977). 
The lower court directed a verdict aaainst !-1ann. Thi: 
Court should review the evidence in a light more favorable 
oi Cl d B 569 P 2d ll?S (Utah 1977) ;~· to Mann. Le ou v. aum, . -
Parson Red-E-Mix Pavincr Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 :::· 
* Distinauished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt UniversitV· 
Reporter, JRestatement (Second) of Torts. 
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The jury could easily have concluded t!"lat '~ann was 
terminated in bad faith. The fact issue should have gone 
to the jury. Utah shoulcl follow the !'1.odern view which holds 
such bad faith termination to be tortious. 
II. THE CONTRACT CLAn~s 
A. Factual Basis for the Contract Claim. 
Al though ~1ann was fired, American Western kept his sub-
agents. After '.-!ann was fired, he received no more override 
commissions on the sales of his sub-agents. ~lann claimed that 
he had a contractual right to keep receiving overrides even 
after his termination. 
Al though American Western had many sales agents, it had 
(prior to '1ann) only one "general agent". That origina.l ''general 
agent" for American Western was called American International 
Marketing (AD1l . The "general agent., agreement between American 
1
·1estern and AIM was executed in 1967 (Ex. 58-P). Mann had 
access to that "general agent" contract and was familiar with 
its terms. The AIM contract provides that the ··general agent·• 
will continue to receive overrides even after termination. 
On January 3, 19 7 5, Mann entered into an oral contract 
I replacing two earlier written "agent" agreements) to become a 
"general agent". Y 
Mann testified that he negotiated to get a contract ~just 
like AI'1". 
'. 
"1 
---
(R. 1252 & 1287). :1ann offered extensi•.re testimony 
- The Cour~ made a soecif ic finding that the parties had 
entered int~ a new oral contract. (~. 1268-1269). 
b 
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. 1 d" -~ - - 3/ . inc u ing an or-er or proor - that this contr~ct was 
l US': 
like AI~1". (See Appendix "A" for an extract of the relevan: 
testi:.".lony). The AP1 contract was offered as an exhibit . . '..·e: 
Western objected. The objection was sustained. 
After plaintiff's evide:ice, defendant made a motior. tc 
dismiss the contract claim on the g-rounds that no proof hac :' 
offered as to the terms of the oral agreement 
".'he !T\otion ::: 
a directed verdict on the contract claim was granted. 
In surnnary, :1ann claimed that he had a contract 'v!":lc:. 
would pay overrides even after his termination. In order to 
make that theory stick, Mann had to show that his oral contra:: 
was "just like" the AIH contract. The trial court refused to 
admit the AIM contract into evidence. Without the AIM contra:: 
in evidence, Mann could not prove the terms of his oral acrm·' 
Directed verdict was granted. 
B. The Written AIM Contract Was the Basis for the 
Oral "General Agent'' Contract Between Mann and 
American ~estern. 
The general rule is that contracts cannot be proved by 
evidence that one of the parties has made similar contracts•;:: 
other persons, unless there is a con.nection between the two 
contracts, or unless it is probative that the course pursued 
in one instance would be followed in another. Ogden Co~ 
h 1926) In th is case, the!; ~9-.·--.Y_:__~~~pbell, 244 P. 1029 (Uta . 
iar: l/ The Court erred by not admitting the offer of pro~~S i!o"" 
Development CO!:£:_V· Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 566 P.~~ 
-lh.- __________ ... d. 
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. 3 sue:-: a con!1ection or probability. Here plain ti ff denanded 
contract "just like" the AI~ contract. 
This case is iC.entical to :-.lelsen v. FaTIT",ers '~utual Auto 
ins. co., 4 lo/is. 2d 36, 90 ::'L~<7.2d 123 (1958). In that case, 
---
t:ie agent sued the insurance coropany for wronqful termination 
o:' an oral agency contract. At trial, a coMpa:-iy official 
:esti'.:ied that the agents were offered similar oral cont:::-acts 
a.nd that one agent denanded that his contract be ;iut in writing. 
!he written contract was introduced and accepted by the co·.irt 
into evidence. See also, ~illiston on Contracts, 3d ed. § 4 7 
(".:\n offer or agreement may also refer to another agreement for 
a definition of terms ••• ") ; Schwartz Tailoring Co. v. Petty, 
140 A.2d 63 (D.C. 1958) ("it is not necessary that a prornise 
be certain within itself if it contains reference to another 
agreement . . . from which the terms may be made clear. ") · 
~acht~~1edic~l Building, Inc. v. Ked, 130 S.E.2d 530, 7~ Ga. 
A9P· 438 (1963) ( " ... A contract may be made sufficiently certain 
by reference to other documents". ) 
C. The Trial Court Erred ~ Failing to Receive the 
AI~ Contract Into Evidence. 
The AD1 contract (Ex. 58-P) was offered but not received 
into evidence. (See generally Appendix "A" hereto). It was 
error for the Court not to receive the contract into evidence. 
The general rule of law is that when the existence of 
~ alleged oral contract is in issue, all the acts and declarations 
Jf t!"ie parties tending to refute or establish it are admissible 
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~ 
together with all the facts connected with the s urro•m<' inc 
circumstances. 17A, C.J.S. Contracts§ 593 p. 1156. See,, 
~re-Fit Door, Inc. v. Dor-Wavs, _Inc., 477 P.:2d 557, 13 Ariz. 
4.38 (1970). 
An early Utah case is squarely in ?Oint, Straw v. Terc 
~
48 Utah 258, 159 P. 44 (1916). In that case, plBintiff sue: 
under the terms of an oral agreement. Defendant adMitted th: 
existence of an oral contract, but alleoed that the terms o' 
the oral agreement were "identical" to a written agreement 
between defendant and a third party. At trial defendant attn 
to introduce the written contract. '!'he contract was not rece: 
An appeal resulted. The Supreme Court gave the =allowing ana:i 
For the purpose of proving their claim in that 
regard, counsel for defendants, in various ways, 
attempted to introduce the contract and specifica-
tions pleaded in their answer. Plaintiff's counsel, 
however, objected to the proffered evidence upon 
the ground that the contracts referred to were 
between other parties, and hence were "immaterial 
and irrelevant". The court it seems, adopted the 
view of plaintiff's counsel and excluded the 
proffered evidence in whatever form it was offered. 
* * * 
From what he did say it is quite clear that the 
ruling is erroneous according to the ~est elementary 
principles of law. Quite true plaintiff could not 
be bound by the terms and conditions of contra7t7 
made between others with whom he was not in pnvity, 
but the defendants by their offer did not seek to 7°h 
bind him. All they attempted to do was to establl~· ,, 
the terms of plaintiff's own contract as the defen ~;­
claimed them to be and thus bind him by those te:: 
the jury should find them to be as con tended by he 
defendants. In order to so bind the plaintiff· t 
_, .i_ • 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
de endants were required to prove at least two 
th ngs: (1) What the terms, conditions, and 
st pulations of the contract they referred to 
in their answer were; and (2) that the olaintiff 
and the defendants had adopted such te~.s, con-
ditions and stipulations as part of the parol 
contract sued on. To show the first was as 
necessary as it was to prove the second, and 
it would be utterly useless to prove one unless 
the other was also proved. 
* * * 
The court, therefore, col'\IT\itted manifest error 
in excluding the defendants' proffered evidence 
bv which they sought to prove the terms, con-
ditions and stipulations-of the contracts referred 
to in the answer. 
* * * 
... defendants had the riqht to establish those 
facts by any competent and material evidence at 
their command. That right was denied them. We 
cannot say what conclusion the jury might have 
reached if the excluded evidence had been admitted. 
We think, therefore, that the trial court was 
clearly in error in excluding defendants' proffered 
evidence, and that the error was prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the defendants. 
III. THE RESTITUTION CLAIM 
Plaintiff's third claim was entitled TerMination After 
~~_tial Performance. That claim was dismissed on the face 
of the pleadings without receiving any evidence on the issues. 
(",.1376, 1447). 
A. Factual Basis For the Restitution Claim. 
Since the claim was dismissed without evidence, this 
Court must review the allegations in the liaht most favorable 
to 0 laintiff. Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 207, 398 P.2d 207 
'"SI; HU£St~~way Dept. 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P.2d 71 (1964). 
-19-
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The followino allegations are pertinent· 
The life insurance industry is generally characteri;o 
by a high turnover in sales agents. A substantial cost is 
required to locate, recruit and train new sales aqents. ~~ 
more, new sales agents generally require loans or advances' 
several :nonths until they begin to earn cornITlissions · thus::' 
turnover in agents represents a major expense to insur~~ 
companies generally. (P.. 198-204, Third Amended Complaint, 
'! 12) . 
In order to avoid such ecpenses, defendant develoi;ied: 
unique program involving defendant's general aqents. ~he 
purpose of the program is to shift its high expense of new 
agent turnover from the insurance company to the general ace· 
(R. 198-204, Third Amended Complaint, 'I 13). 
Pursuant to the policy, the general acrent bears the 
administrative costs of finding and training new snb-agents. 
Defendant sometimes makes lo~ns or advances to help new sub·) 
get started. Howevever, the general acrent guarantees all~ 
loans and repays defendant if the sub-agent defaults. 1~.:: 
204, Third Amended Complaint, ~I 14) . 
Plaintiff has acted as a general agent for defendant: 
accordance with the foregoing policy. Pursuant to this pol:: 
plaintiff has expended substantial sums to locate, recruit' 
train new sub-agents. Plaintiff has also cruaranteed manY :: 
made by defendant to such new sub-agents. ( R. 198-204' :' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:_--;e~.cec complain':, '! 15) . 
Plaintif:'s only coMpensation for such financial corl'lit-
;ients and labors is the override corl'lis.sion which plaintiff 
receives on future sales made by sub-agents. 
Thi re .:'.\mended Car.plaint, 'I 16) . 
(~. 198-204' 
Plaintiff has performed the following services :or t!'le 
iefendant: 
(a) Conducted advertising prograMs to solicit 
new sub-agents for defendant· 
(b) Recruited and signed up approximately 300 new 
sub-agents for defendant; 
(c) Provided training programs for new sub-agents~ 
(d) Provided personal financial guarantees and 
other financial commitments to the said 300 new sub-
agents; 
(e) Supervised the sales activities of the said 300 
new sub-agents; 
(f) Spent his own funds for office, travel and other 
expenses associated with items (a) through (e) above. 
(R. 198-204, Third A.mended Complaint. 4[ 29). 
Plaintiff has duly performed all of the conditions of the 
said oral contract alleged in paragraph 9 of the '!'hird Amended 
~Mplaint so far as he was permitted to do so by defendant. 
1
"· 198-204, Third Amended Complaint, '[ 30). 
> -21-
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Defendant has in bad faith terminated plaintiff anc 
ordered him to refrain fror. the performance of any further 
service under his general agent's contract and by the sa~ 
acts rendered in impossible for plaintiff to complete per-
formance thereof. (R. 198-204, Third Amended Complaint, ,, ; 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissin<J ~1ann' s Claic 
for Restitution. 
The facts as pleaded set up a clai.r:i for restitution. 
~he cause is governed by § 1109 of Corbin on Contracts. 
One who has rendered service or supplied work, 
labor, and materials under a contract with another, 
but who has been wrongfully discharged or otherwise 
prevented from so far fully performing as to earn 
the agreed compensation, may regard the contract 
as terminated and get judqrnent for the reasonable 
value of all that the defendant has received in 
performance of the contract. This rule is applicable 
to contracts of personal service and to all kinds of 
construction contracts. The defendant's breach Mav 
have been a repudiation, a discharqe, a preventi~ 
of performance by the plaintiff, or a failure to 
perform the agreed exchange due from the defendant .. 
Nevertheless, if the defenant has committed a vital 
breach that prevents the express contract debt from. 
arising the court will value the performance rendere'. 
by the plaintiff and COIT'lpel the defendant to make 
restitution of the a.Il)Ount •. 
Under the contract, a "general agent" has four respo~: 
bilities: (1) to recruit new sales agents, (2) to train ne·i 
sales agents, ( '3) to finance new sales agents (by loans or 
guarantees, and ( 4) to provide on-going supervision of sale: 
agents. In return for these services, the "general agent":' 
paid an override commission on future sales of his aoents. 
When ~1ann was fired, he had col'.'.pleted three of hl 5 
responsibilities. He had recruited, trained and fin~c~ 1 
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0 ~ sales agents. He would ha'1e provided the continuing 
supervision but was fired and denied the opportunity to super-
vise. 
A court of equity might conclude that Mann has already 
delivered 75% of the value of his bargain -- i.e., he has 
recruited, trained, financed sales agents.~/ Since !1ann is 
prevented from completing the remaining 25% of his bargain 
(supervision) he gets no future override commissions under 
t~ contract. But, the court may place a value on the 75% 
which was already performed and repay ~ann for the value of 
those services. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred by dismissing Mann's claim for 
restitution. Mann should have been permitted to present his 
evidence to establish a claim in equity. 
The Court further erred by refusing to admit the AB~ 
contract into evidence. Without that contract, Mann could not 
prove the terms of his oral contract, and a verdict was directed 
against Mann on the counterclaim. 
The Court further erred by directing a verdict on the 
tort claim of bad faith termination. A jury could reasonable 
infer that Mann was terminated in bad faith for the purpose 
--
4/ 
: The remaining duty was suoervision, but the record shows 
-!lat general agents perform only nominal supervisory duties. 
IR. 1046 lines 5-15). 
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of cutting hi::'.'! out of his future overrides. :''.1e issue s~o,;; 
have gone to the jury. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ L) , ~ 
'..<./ -. ..___I .:_1 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant to Randy L. Dryer, 
attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 455 South 300 East. Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 2nd 
prepaid and properly addressed. 
-24- cf 
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T!<.A.'JSCRIPT OF RE:.EVA..'l'T TES':'IMONY REG.:l.2D!)IG ADM:SS!ON CF 
EXHIBIT 58. 
Q Tell the jury what ;.;as said by ':!'le ?a=tiss on 
c:iat occasion. 
A :.tr. :1atheson !lad wri-:ten dcwr. ·On :;:;a;::er a 
?rO?csed general agent's contract starting at 94 ;::ercen': and, 
based on •1olume, working up to l·'.JO ?ercent. I told Frank 
that was not acceptable at that time, but I ~anted a contrac': 
just like AIM' S. 
Q And who is AIM? 
A American International !1arketing. And he agreed 
that he could give :ne_ a contract--he could not gi •1e me one 
just like AI~'s because of the conflict with the S percent. 
He agreed to give :ne a hundred percent ar.d :nake some ccn-
cessions for the other S percent. Ar.d ':::iat 's I':em ~ro. 2, 
which, as it says in his notes, "concessions to his agency," 
he would advance my agents on submit business and he would 
advance the managers overrides as a concession. 
Q Anything else said during the meeting? 
A Yes. We discussed a 1-percent office allowance. 
t<e talked a:icut the straight commission on m.y 9 88 account, 
3.!ld ::i.e was worried about that balance. So was !. He wanted 
:'.lat worked off . 
. 
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.:; :'~at was t.:'"le .3.C::8'-!r:": :.~--:.J.~ ;c~s ::a::~ :: ·~;· 
...... 
account? 
produced, and there was probably two o::: :h.:ee thousa::C: :: ... 
there could have been more, that I cwec the ccrn9any on:.~:: 
account. So he wanted ::ie tc ·,;c::-:: it o·-.:t c~. 3. s::"-:;::: ::::. 
basis. 
Q Anything else saii? 
general agent's contract, that I would '.':ave to 11aca:e t~e 
office space at the home office. 
Q Did he tell you why? 
A Yes. 
Q What did he say? 
A The other general agent :el t that I had un!a:: 
advantage in that I had a free office space. And they sa:: 
if you are going to go ahead with this thing, ycu are ~c:;: 
to have to make hi:n get out of there--which :: ag:-eed ':C :: 1 
subsequently leased office space from the company next :cc: 
Q Do you remember anything else a!:out the mee::: 
.~ Only that in his notes he says, 
consider." 
.. 
Q ~et :ne as;. you: Yet.: nc':ice 0:1 t::-.e w::::a:. 
in the upoer right-ha~d co:::~er a:::e scme ::;~res, 
been :<'d out. 
i j d 
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M~. DeBRY: ~ay I show the jury, ycur ~onor? 
THE COURT: Let me see what you are re:e=:::-ing to. 
Any objection? 
~R. PRI~CE: ~o. 
Q Do you remember why those figures were X'd out? 
A Yes. They were the prelL~inary !igures that he 
had of:ered and I told hL~ were unacceptable, and sc when 
he said we will go ahead with the 100 percent ·..ri':..."lc•.it having 
to wcr.'< our way up, he crossed them out. 
Q Okay. Now, was any conclusion reached? 
A No. 
Q What was--
A I said that I would think it over, and that after-
noon I stuck my head in the door and said, "Frank, we have 
got a deal. I will move next door. We can arrange for the 
rental of the office space." 
(R. 1252-1254). 
* * * 
Q Now, I'm going to show you what was marked 
yesterday but not put into evidence as Exhibit 58. Can you 
identify that? 
A Yes, that's the general agent agreement between 
American Wester.l Life Insurance Company and .~erican International 
~ar~eting. It is a general agent's agreement. 
Q Okay. Are you generally fami:iar with the ter.ns 
and conditions of that agreement? 
A Yes. 
Q And how ~id you ~eccme fami:iar wi~h chat document? 
i i i 
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.a.. As director of 3.cencies I had su~e~·1 ; 5 ; 
- C"" - ...... on ~: 
American International ~arketing branch, dis-:=ict, r:!si::., 
and divisional managers. On occasion, there ·,;er-e auesr"· 
. .. .. ~.,; 
about the status of A.'Ilerican I:-iternational :-tar:<:etl:ig a~c :· 
general agent's contract. I had to be : ami liar wit:i 0:;e ::· 
so that I could intelligently discuss them. 
Q l\nd where was the document located at ti:e 
American Wes~ern Li!e Insur3.~Ce Company o::ices? 
A It was located in the file ·.inde!' .::l,rneri~a" 
International ~arketing. 
Q And did you have access to that file? 
A Yes. 
Q And on how many occasions during your 
employment did you have occasion to get into that file and 
review that document? 
A I can't be certain as to how many times exa(:. 
Frank had given me a copy of it because he and I :iad disc:: 
it many times, and I had a copy of it in my file in my a:::: 
Q Now, is that the document you were talk:::g a: 
when you said to Mr. Matheson, "I want a contract ~ike ;::!' 
A That's the document. That' s the or.ly ;ene:a: 
agent's contract I am familiar with. 
Q Is that the document you were talking a::ioc:: 
A That's the document. 
MR. ~eBRY: Offer 58. 
~R. PR!~CE: r will obJect to that. 
iv 
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think there is a ?roper foundation at this tL~e. 
(". 1256-1257). 
* * * 
Q ~r. Mann, this morning you testified about a 
couple of meetings that took place on a day in January 1974. 
I -:i. 
Q '5. After those ~eetings, dij you thi~k you 
had a contract? 
A Yes. 
Q Afid what was ycur understandi~? o: the ~er:ns a~d 
conditions of that contract? 
!1R. PRI~iCE: I will objer:t to that. I think 
he's already testified as to what matters were discussed and 
what was agreed upon. 
('.l.. 1283). 
* * * 
~R. DeBRY: May I proceed? 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. DeBRY: As I recall, Your Senor, t!le 
initial foundation question to ~r. Mann was: Did ycu t!"l:.nk 
you had a contract after the meeting? The answer was: Yes. 
The next question was: What was your understanding of the 
ter.ns and conditions of the contract? 
If the ,.,itness had been per:nit.ted to answer, 
cs '::"\at t'.':e ter:ns and conditions of my con tract 'N"ere exactl:;t 
:i~e ':~e A~~ contract with some exceptions." 
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-, 
·,ica~ '' '°"' 1,1 
:-ie ·..,.cu.:.d '.'lave 
answered, "In general, ~y ;enera: agent's ccn~=ic: ""U 
exclusive. I would not serve on t'.'1e executi·:e ccr..r.iit:ee, 
did not want to •.ise the na.'lle American West, and : ·,..as r.ot 
participating i:l the stock options." His fu:::-t=:er a::.s·•e: 
would be that, those were all exceptio::s to t:-ie wri::en ~! 
then ,.-ould '::e t::at his '..lr.de=standing is t::-,at :-.e ::ad an a~::· 
just li:<e Ex!'libit 58 wit:i t:ie listed exce~-:io:-.s, a: wn:c:. 
poi::t I ·.,.ould have offered t.'1e A!~1 agreer::ent i:-.l:.c a•ridence. 
(R. 132'-'.). 
* * * 
The record will show the proffer anC. you: 
acceptance of the Court' s ruling and your continuing object: 
too. 
See: 
l9i7) 
l 
, 
The previous ruling will stand.~ 
The court erred in exclusing the 
Kabil i::evelo-oment Cor.;. v. ~-h::rnot, 
for an example squarelf i:: :;ioint. 
(-R. - 1336). 
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